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The ecosystem services (ES) concept is one of the main avenues for conveying society’s dependence on natural ecosystems. On-ground applica-
tions of the concept are now widespread and diverse and include its use as a communication tool, for policy guidance and priority setting, and 
for designing economic instruments for conservation. Each application raises ethical considerations beyond traditional controversies related to 
the monetary valuation of nature. We review ethical considerations across major on-ground applications and group them into the following 
categories: anthropocentric framing, economic metaphor, monetary valuation, commodification, sociocultural impact, changes in motivations, 
and equity implications. Different applications of the ES concept raise different suites of ethical issues, and we propose methods to address the 
issues most relevant to each application. We conclude that the ES concept should be considered as only one among various alternative approaches 
to valuing nature and that reliance on economic metaphors can exclude other motivations for protecting ecosystems.
Keywords: commodification, conservation policy, ecosystem management, environmental ethics, equity
promote a broader appreciation of the contribution of eco-
systems to human well-being.
Practical applications of the ES concept are now becom-
ing widespread (e.g., Goldman et al. 2008, Tallis et al. 2008) 
and include payments-for-ES (PES) schemes (e.g., Turpie 
et al. 2008), spatial planning (e.g., Lubchenco and Sutley 
2010), greening of national accounting (e.g., Boyd 2007), 
and directing strategic arguments in high-level policy and 
lawmaking (e.g., Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and Forest Degradation [REDD]; Miles and Kapos 2008). 
The rapid growth in practical applications of the ES concept 
has illuminated ethical considerations related to its use. For 
example, concerns have been raised that an emphasis on 
financial valuations of nature may undermine other forms 
of valuation based on, for example, moral or cultural values 
(e.g., Chee 2004, Bowles 2008).
As the ES concept becomes increasingly integrated into 
environmental science and policy, the time is ripe for a 
comprehensive and reflective consideration of the range of 
ethical questions associated with the concept’s application. 
Some critiques of ES have been focused only on a subset 
of the diverse, multifaceted applications of the concept. For 
The concept of ecosystem services (ES) has gained global attention in recent years as a framework for promoting 
the societal benefits of ecosystem conservation. This has 
been strongly influenced by widely read scientific publica-
tions and international initiatives, such as the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment (MA 2005) and The Economics of 
Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB; Kumar 2010), and by 
increasing  on-ground application of ES-related policy instru-
ments (e.g., Tallis et al. 2008). Governments are increasingly 
integrating goals targeted at the protection of ES into their 
policy directives. For example, the governments of China, 
Costa Rica, Mexico, and Ecuador all have schemes to pay 
landholders who engage in management (e.g., protection of 
forest or improved agricultural practices) that secures the 
supply of hydrological services (e.g., clean water provision; 
Sánchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007, Liu et al. 2008, Muñoz-Piña 
et al. 2008). Global nongovernment organizations such as 
The Nature Conservancy, Conservation International, and 
the World Wildlife Fund have projects around the world 
for investments in market-based instruments that aim to 
protect ES and biodiversity. The increasing attention paid 
to ES can be attributed largely to the concept’s potential to 
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example, there has been particularly strong criticism of valu-
ing nature in monetary terms (e.g., Child 2009, Sagoff 2011). 
However, many practical applications of the ES concept do 
not require such monetary valuations (e.g., education; land-
use planning; strategic policymaking; and, in some cases, 
even PES schemes). It is important to identify which ethical 
issues are relevant to particular ES applications so that the 
most pertinent issues may be addressed in a given manage-
ment context.
A comprehensive consideration of the range of ethical 
issues associated with different ES applications is also timely 
because many applications are relatively new and so some 
ethical facets are only just becoming apparent. Moreover, 
the debate on the ethics of ES that has been most accessible 
to ES researchers and practitioners has been focused mostly 
on the theoretical underpinnings of the approach, which has 
left the diverse range of practical applications unaddressed. 
Here, we focus attention on the most common on-ground 
applications of the ES concept and identify the main  ethical 
issues associated with each application. We begin with a 
brief description of the range of practical applications. This 
is followed by a categorization of the major kinds of ethical 
issues and their relevance to applications of the concept. 
We then identify ways for addressing these issues to improve 
on-ground application of the ES concept. We finish with 
advice on how to integrate consideration of the ethics of 
ES into a broader ecosystem management framework.
Throughout the present article, we note where a mis-
understanding of the major principles of the concept may 
lead to ethical concerns and where modifying the applica-
tion of the concept is necessary to address these concerns. 
Contrasting the core metaphor of nature as a service 
provider with alternative metaphors describing the value 
of nature becomes more crucial as the ES concept gains 
prominence. Overreliance on economic metaphors in dis-
cussions about the value of nature may erode noneconomic 
motivations for conservation and may lead policymakers to 
falsely conclude that there are possible equivalents (or sub-
stitutes) between economic and ecological values. We show 
that an exclusive focus on monetary valuations raises par-
ticular ethical issues, but we also demonstrate that different 
applications of the ES concept raise different types of ethical 
issues, and these issues can be addressed using a range of 
management approaches.
Applications of the ES concept
There are many and varied applications of the ES  concept. 
We have grouped these into three broad themes— application 
as a communication tool, for policy guidance and the set-
ting of priorities, and as a strategic objective in the design of 
policy instruments—to demonstrate the general association 
among the different applications (table 1).
The ES concept may be used as a tool to help communi-
cate the importance of ecosystems and biodiversity to human 
well-being in a language that reflects dominant political and 
economic views. Communication may be focused purely on 
raising awareness or education, and prominent examples 
of this include the MA (2005), which raised awareness of 
the impacts of ecosystem change on human well-being, and 
TEEB (Kumar 2010), which raised awareness of the costs 
of policy inaction to halt biodiversity loss. The ES concept 
may also support strategic arguments designed to influ-
ence conservation decisions or to direct policy (EC 2011). 
Finally, the ES concept can provide a framework to guide 
and  sometimes improve interdisciplinary communication 
among academic disciplines concerned with sustainability 
(e.g., ecology, economics, political science) and among aca-
demics, policymakers, and various stakeholders and interest 
groups (e.g., farmers, developers, conservationists).
Another important application of the ES concept is prior-
ity setting for policy guidance and decisionmaking support. 
The ES concept and related valuation tools are often used 
Table 1. Applications of the ecosystem services concept.
Ecosystem service application Themes Examples
awareness raising and education communication tool Ma, tEEB, Ecuador national mapping
strategic arguments communication tool European union biodiversity strategy to 2020 (Ec 2011),
intergovernmental science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem services 
interdisciplinary communication communication tool Ecological economics, sustainability science
cost–benefit analyses Policy guidance or priority setting
Green accounting Policy guidance or priority setting integrated system of Environmental and Economic accounts, 
common international classification of Ecosystem services
spatial planning strategic objective or policy instruments integrated coastal zone management
Land or resource management strategic objective or policy instruments natural capital Project
Policymaking and law writing strategic objective or policy instruments kyoto Protocol, rEdd
Multiobjective programs strategic objective or policy instruments Ecosystem services for Poverty alleviation
Payments for ecosystem services strategic objective or policy instruments Water fund, rEdd, PEs programs in costa rica and Mexico
Abbreviations: MA, Millennium Ecosystem Assessment; PES, payments for ecosystem services; REDD, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
 Forest Degradation; TEEB, The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity.
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1989). Underlying the values that humans assign to nature 
are key metaphors that organize human thinking in favor 
of specific types of values at the expense of others (Larson 
2011). Conservationists have always used various meta-
phors to characterize nature and its values. For example, 
John Muir (cited in Nash 1982, p. 168) referred to forests 
as “cathedrals of the people,” whereas others see nature as 
an organism (e.g., Lovelock 2000). To regard nature as a 
provider of services is one particular metaphor that carries 
different kinds of value connotations (Norgaard 2010). For 
example, it promotes valuing nature primarily through the 
benefits that humans derive from ecosystems and places 
these benefits in the same context as those delivered through 
human activities.
Economic metaphor. The metaphor that describes ecosystems 
as (natural) capital and ecosystem functions as (ecosystem) 
services adopts an economic framing, potentially favoring 
the expansion of the rationality of profit calculus to the 
environmental domain (Gómez-Baggethun and Ruiz-Pérez 
2011). Some authors have been highly critical of this concep-
tualization (e.g., Callicott 1984, Naess 1989), because there 
are ethical concerns that refer to broader human interests 
than just the instrumental ones (Norton 2005). Adopting an 
economic language and metaphor to frame human–nature 
relationships implies the idea of possible equivalents (i.e., 
certain components of nature can be replaced completely 
by other components or human-derived alternatives). For 
example, an implication of possible equivalents is that the 
loss of a species and its various contributions to ecosystem 
function is completely compensated for by other species in 
the system or through human alternatives (e.g., the loss of 
biological control agents compensated for in all contexts 
through the use of pesticides). Although substitution and 
compensation for the loss of species and habitats may in 
some cases be economically rational, there are other ratio-
nalities that do not accept substitution. From the perspec-
tive of environmental ethics, one could also argue for the 
importance of recognizing nature’s intrinsic moral value and 
could argue that this value is inappropriately reduced when 
nature is subjected to simple economic measures based on, 
for example, the public’s willingness to pay (Sagoff 2011). As 
the ES concept increases in prominence, it becomes argu-
ably even more important to contrast its core metaphor of 
nature as a supplier of services with alternative metaphors 
and ways of valuing nature (e.g., nature as kin; see the 
“Addressing ethical considerations” section).
Monetary valuation. Monetary valuation of ES is a specific 
instance of economic framing, and so it includes all of the 
concerns listed in the section above and is a major source of 
ethical controversy (Spash 2008, Child 2009). For example, 
the monetary valuation of species raises the ethical issue 
of the anthropocentric bias in how value is assigned across 
species. Martín-López and colleagues (2008) demonstrated 
that visible and well-known species (e.g., the giant panda 
to quantify ecological impacts and socioeconomic costs and 
benefits and to document the distributional impacts involved 
in different options for land-use planning. This serves to 
improve understanding of the broader effects of decisions 
(e.g., their impact on ecosystems and, indirectly, on socio-
economic systems) and to better inform approaches to bal-
ancing trade-offs. This application theme is arguably the best 
known and most controversial because it generally involves 
the monetary valuation of benefits obtained by people from 
ES. However, benefits are valued by different people in differ-
ent ways, and the application of the ES concept allows these 
benefits to be more concretely conceptualized and, in some 
cases, paid for. Practical applications related to monetary 
valuation include cost–benefit analyses and green accounting 
(table 1). However, valuation—in the sense of scoring on the 
basis of importance—need not involve placing a monetary 
value on these benefits (e.g., Chan et al. 2012).
The ES concept may be referenced in various on-ground 
practices or policies in which ecosystem protection is one 
of the strategic objectives. In this way, the application of the 
concept can shape the approach taken for the design of policy 
instruments and project execution, including how proj-
ects are managed and how stakeholders are identified and 
involved. This type of application moves beyond simply try-
ing to raise public awareness (as with communication) and 
influence decisionmaking (as in priority setting) and empha-
sizes attaining particular benefits delivered through policies 
or practices that protect ES. Practical examples include ES 
embedded in large-scale spatial planning (e.g., integrated 
coastal zone management; see, e.g., www.pegasoproject.eu), 
modifying land or resource management to promote service 
delivery (e.g., managing agricultural landscapes to support 
native pollinating species; Kremen et al. 2004), high-level 
policymaking and law writing (e.g., the Kyoto Protocol, 
REDD, and the Convention on Biological Diversity), PES 
(Kinzig et al. 2011), and multiobjective programs, especially 
those linked to a development agenda (e.g., Ecosystem 
Services for Poverty Alleviation, www.espa.ac.uk).
Ethical considerations in applying the ES concept
In this section, we classify ethical issues related to the 
practical applications of the ES concept into seven main 
categories.
Anthropocentric framing. Application of the ES concept raises 
ethical considerations, largely because the concept endorses 
an anthropocentric perspective that, in principle, is solely 
concerned with the attributes of nature that contribute to 
human well-being (MA 2005). The term service emphasizes 
the value that natural entities have for human purposes (i.e., 
their instrumental values) at the expense of an emphasis on 
their intrinsic values (Ludwig 2000). An anthropocentric 
bias in valuation is problematic, because, as some environ-
mental ethicists have argued, nonhuman organisms merit 
consideration in and of themselves and not only in reference 
to what they can do for people (e.g., Callicot 1984, Naess 
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[Ailuropoda melanoleuca] or the mountain gorilla [Gorilla 
beringei beringei]) attract greater attention and, therefore, a 
higher willingness to pay from the public than do less visible 
and more poorly known species (e.g., micro organisms). This 
has important ethical implications in terms of, for example, 
how priorities are set and public funds are allocated for 
conservation.
Contingent valuation is a frequently used tool for the 
monetary valuation of ES because many services are not 
private goods, so they are generally not directly associated 
with existing markets. However, there is evidence showing 
that respondents to contingent valuation surveys often refuse 
to value nature in monetary terms (O’Neill and Spash 2000, 
García-Llorente et al. 2011). So-called protest responses (high 
individual bids, zero bids, or a refusal to bid) have been inter-
preted by some researchers as respondents’ unwillingness to 
assign a monetary value to ecosystem components because 
they feel that this is an act of betrayal of a moral commitment 
(Svedsäter 2003). Moreover, proponents concerned with the 
distributional justice of the benefits and burdens of nature 
conservation have noted that the poor sell cheap; that is, 
people in need are willing (or forced) to accept lower sums 
of money for ES loss (Martínez-Alier 2002). Finally, some 
authors have objected to valuing ES in monetary terms on 
the grounds that it promotes the commodification of nature 
(e.g., Gómez-Baggethun and Ruiz-Pérez 2011).
Commodification. The commodification of ecosystem func-
tions and biodiversity (i.e., the expansion of market trade 
to previously nonmarketed areas of the environment) is an 
important ethical consideration related to the application of 
the ES concept. Ethical concerns associated with the com-
modification of nature are not new. For example, under the 
rubric of commodity fiction, Polanyi (1957) scrutinized the 
commodification of land, arguing that such commodifica-
tion involved subjugating the very essence of human societ-
ies to market forces. Polanyi (1957) wrote, “The economic 
function is but one of many vital functions of land. It invests 
man’s life with stability; it is the site of his habitation; it is a 
condition of his physical safety; it is the landscape” (p. 178). 
Ethical controversies related to commodification have grown 
with the expansion of new market-based mechanisms for the 
management of ES (Spash 2008, Kosoy and Corbera 2010, 
Gómez-Baggethun and Ruiz-Pérez 2011). The commodifica-
tion of nature is now a widespread phenomenon associated 
with a growing number of ecosystem functions (e.g., carbon 
sequestration, watershed regulation, habitat provision) that 
can be increasingly traded in markets through mechanisms 
such as PES, carbon markets, and biodiversity offsets.
Protest responses recorded in contingent valuation sur-
veys, as was discussed above, have also been interpreted as 
resistance by the respondents to a representation of ecosys-
tem components in a commodity-like fashion (Vatn 2000). 
According to some authors, this may reflect recognition 
by people that there are ethical limits to commodification 
(e.g., Douai 2009). A further concern with commodification 
is the notion of the relational value of natural entities 
(Muraca 2011), which argues that human well-being rests 
on relationships with the human and nonhuman environ-
ment and that these relationships cannot be adequately 
commodified, because their very essence is uniqueness, not 
transferability. In fact, adopting the commodity metaphor 
that is often implicit in the ES concept implies the idea of 
possible equivalents and of the capacity to substitute and 
compensate for the loss of species and habitats (e.g., trad-
able development permits in habitat and wetland banking; 
Spash 2008).
Sociocultural impact. The use of market instruments in the 
application of the ES concept raises ethical questions about 
the sociocultural impacts of these instruments, especially 
when they are applied in rural or indigenous communities 
where external markets may be a relatively new phenom-
enon. Sociocultural impacts (which may be either positive 
or negative) can include long-term changes in quality of life, 
independence, attitudes or belief systems, culture, security, 
the empowerment of women, community identity, or other 
changes in behavior and motivations for conserving nature 
(Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010). Assessments of sociocultural 
impacts related to the application of the ES concept must be 
focused on both short- and long-term effects, because these 
can vary. For example, although short-term assessments of 
PES schemes have shown increased income to payee com-
munities, there may be longer-term social impacts of these 
schemes, and anthropological evidence from integrated 
conservation and development programs suggests that the 
likelihood of long-term impacts is real (e.g., West 2006), and 
those impacts can include the loss of tenure rights, changes 
in social institutions (such as marriage), and a reduction in 
cultural diversity. The lack of reliable data to address the 
long-term effects of PES and other economic instruments 
that build on the ES concept is partly a consequence of the 
lack of adequate monitoring and is partly because socio-
cultural impacts are often indirect and difficult to measure 
and, therefore, tend to go unobserved or unrecorded (Caplow 
et al. 2010).
Although the empirical basis for addressing this issue is still 
weak, there is emerging evidence of cultural impacts from 
the application of PES schemes (Grieg-Gran et al. 2005). For 
example, research on PES programs in Central America and 
Uganda has documented a loss of customary tenure rights 
or access to the commons (Corbera et al. 2007, Carter 2009), 
whereas similar research in Mexico has reported reductions 
in dietary diversity and a loss of cultural practices (Ibarra 
et al. 2011). Moreover, eligibility criteria to participate in PES 
programs have made it difficult for the poor to participate, 
usually because of the requirement of a land title in order 
to establish the contract (Corbera et al. 2007). Because cul-
tural changes are often slow, addressing the ethical question 
of the full range of sociocultural impacts of PES programs 
and other ES applications will require robust assessments of 
baseline conditions and medium- to  long-term monitoring. 
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We believe that comanagement schemes in which govern-
ment agencies work in collaboration with local communi-
ties would be well positioned to conduct this monitoring to 
ensure year-to-year consistency in assessment procedures 
and the longevity of funding support.
Changes in motivations. An important ethical question raised 
in relation to the establishment of economic incentives to 
secure ES supply relates to potential changes in motivations 
for protecting the environment. It has been argued that the 
very conceptualization of ecosystem functions in economic 
terms can affect motivations for conservation and may favor 
utilitarian logic in understanding human–nature relation-
ships (Vatn 2000). Furthermore, empirical data from behav-
ioral experiments suggest that environmental policies based 
on economic incentives such as PES involve a risk of eroding 
noneconomic incentives for environmental stewardship, a 
phenomenon often referred to as motivational crowding out 
(Bowles 2008, Vatn 2010). For example, Vatn (2010) argued 
that although PES may strengthen community relations 
and may simplify necessary actions for environmental care, 
these schemes may also introduce instrumental logic and 
may, in some cases, worsen the status of the environment by 
crowding out other environmental virtues. This issue can be 
particularly problematic, because further empirical evidence 
from experimental economics suggests that once the moti-
vational change has taken place (i.e., an economic incentive 
replaces a moral incentive), it may be difficult to return 
to the original motivation even if the economic incentive 
disappears (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000). Moreover, if 
monetary payments are not large enough to compensate for 
the opportunity cost of conservation (e.g., restrictions on 
obtaining an income from the conserved land), instruments 
such as PES might be counterproductive (i.e., they might 
result in weaker conservation outcomes).
Equity implications. Independent of the question of how ES 
are valued is the fact that protecting the supply of services 
can bestow asymmetric costs and benefits to different sectors 
of society. This raises the important issue of the ethically 
appropriate assignation of costs and benefits. Problems such 
as these are the essence of environmental justice, focused 
primarily on the fair distribution of environmental costs 
and benefits and the procedural aspects of attaining this dis-
tribution (Schlossberg 2007). This is directly relevant to the 
management of ES. For example, in China, upstream land-
owners are required to manage forest cover to ensure the 
ongoing supply of hydrological services primarily to down-
stream beneficiaries (Liu et al. 2008). However, protection 
of forests could represent an opportunity cost to upstream 
land owners who may wish to clear the land—for  example, 
to grow crops. Upstream suppliers may rightfully claim 
monetary compensation (e.g., PES) for engaging in land 
management that benefits others (at a potentially personal 
cost). However, one might argue that upstream landowners 
have a preexisting moral obligation not to harm others by 
the aforementioned land clearing. Environmental justice 
concerns are also relevant when, for example, a landholder 
utilizes ES for his or her personal profit (e.g., harvesting 
 timber) but subsequently compromises the provision of 
other ES that may benefit the broader community (e.g., car-
bon storage, water filtration, recreation). An assessment of 
the value of the lost ES is fundamental to identifying a fair 
distribution of costs and benefits.
Although the discussion above relates primarily to intragen-
erational equity, intergenerational equity is an equally rel-
evant component of environmental justice concerns and the 
ethics of ES. Ethical considerations arise, for example, when 
current generations consider giving up current income for 
the benefit of future generations, or the opposite—gaining 
benefits now at the expense of future generations (TEEB 
2008). The preferences expressed in current markets cannot 
capture the preferences of future generations. Discount rates 
are the solution generally suggested by economists to address 
this problem. However, these discount rates are often arbi-
trarily fixed and tend to undervalue the interests of future 
generations by using rates that are too high (Martínez-Alier 
2002). For example, TEEB reported that “a 4% discount rate 
means that we value a natural service to our own grand-
children (50 years hence) at one-seventh the utility we derive 
from it” (TEEB 2008, p. 5). One way of tackling this issue is to 
use discount rates that are variable—that is, much higher in 
the near future than in the more distant future—to account 
for the reality of personal discounting and the ethics of social 
discounting for future generations (Sumaila and Walters 
2005). TEEB (2008) advocated using social discount rates, 
which engage ethical aspects involved in choices such as con-
sumption now versus later or consumption for society versus 
consumption for individuals.
Addressing ethical considerations
In this section, we outline the ethical concerns pertinent to 
each application of the ES concept and describe strategies 
to address these concerns. In certain cases, it may be appro-
priate to simply provide a more detailed explanation of the 
major principles of the ES concept to alleviate ethical con-
cerns. In other circumstances, modifying how the concept is 
applied on the ground is crucial to addressing ethical issues 
(table 2).
Ethical concerns related to anthropocentric and economic 
framing pertain to all the applications that explicitly refer 
to the ES concept (i.e., nature as a source of services). In 
relation to communication tools (i.e., raising awareness, 
strategic arguments, interdisciplinary communication), the 
use of economic framing alone may be avoided by explic-
itly employing multiple metaphors to describe nature—for 
example, nature as material life support, nature as sacred, 
nature as kin, or humans as stewards of nature. The eco-
nomic metaphor does not necessarily need to be central to 
any communication regarding how ecosystems contribute to 
human well-being. Communication about the multiple ways 
in which nature not only sustains but enriches human lives 
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with the ES concept, one might take a 
comprehensive, deliberative, and inclu-
sive approach to addressing manage-
ment issues, including an appropriate 
framing of the problem and choice 
among available management options 
(see the “Placing ES in a broader man-
agement context” section).
Concerns about the monetary val-
uation of nature relate primarily to 
priority-setting applications and, to 
a lesser extent, the design of policy 
instruments. To address these con-
cerns, it may be possible and appropri-
ate to employ nonmonetary measures 
of valuation either alone or in concert 
with monetary measures (table 2). For 
example, Chan and colleagues (2012) 
described eight dimensions of values 
pertinent to appropriate valuation 
and decisionmaking in the context of 
protecting ES, including whether the 
values at hand are associated with con-
sequences, moral principles, or virtues 
or whether they are best understood 
as characteristic of groups versus indi-
viduals. When and if using monetary 
measures for valuation is desirable, 
attention should also be given to the 
most appropriate design of non market 
valuation. For example, it might be 
desirable to employ choice experi-
ments, in which monetary values can be 
derived from choices among alternatives in which monetary 
measures are but one variable among several others (e.g., 
the choice between different types of vacations to Vancouver 
Island, Canada, that may involve seeing sea otters, a guided 
wildlife tour or other organized activities, various kinds of 
accommodation, and an associated cost). This approach 
may be more useful than traditional contingent valuation 
in which stated monetary values are requested directly (e.g., 
How much would you be willing to pay?).
Ethical questions raised by the commodification of nature 
relate primarily to policy-instrument applications and, 
more specifically, to those implying tradable permits for 
ES manipulation (e.g., carbon markets, wetland banking, 
biodiversity offsets). Addressing commodification concerns 
may be partly achieved through promoting approaches to 
manage common-property resources rather than privatiz-
ing resources. For example, PES programs can be seen as a 
means of privatizing a resource that previously had some 
qualities of a public good (Kinzig et al. 2011) and is an 
attractive option for managing for sustainability if the argu-
ments related to the tragedy of the commons are accepted. 
However, Ostrom and colleagues (1999) demonstrated that 
such tragedies can be avoided through collective action 
moves far beyond narrow human self-interest and includes 
aspects such as emotional attachment, cultural meaning, or 
aesthetic experience.
When deciding on the most appropriate metaphor to use 
to communicate the value of nature, it is pertinent to con-
sider the target audience. For example, some policymakers or 
economic rationalists may more easily dismiss noneconomic 
arguments for protecting ecosystems, especially where mon-
etary valuation is central to guiding decisions among com-
peting values. However, deeply held personal values may 
trump economic rationalism; therefore, a detailed under-
standing of the personal and professional backgrounds of 
message recipients is likely crucial to successfully conveying 
the value of nature.
In providing policy and priority-setting guidance and in 
developing strategic objectives and designing policy instru-
ments, the ES approach is only one potential strategy for 
achieving desired outcomes in nature conservation and 
improving human livelihoods. Acknowledging the legitimacy 
of alternative approaches and valuation languages for conserv-
ing nature helps to avoid any one strategy, including the ES 
concept, dominating the conservation discourse. To achieve 
this objective in the current context, instead of beginning 
Table 2. Addressing ethical considerations for each application of the ecosystem 
services concept.
Ethical considerations 
Most relevant practical 
applications Addressing ethical considerations
anthropocentric framing  
and economic metaphor
all Employ multiple metaphors to describe 
nature (e.g., stewardship of nature).
consider the ecosystem services 
concept as one of many possible 
management options.
Monetary valuation and 
commodification
Policy guidance and priority 
setting, strategic objective 
and policy instruments
Employ nonmonetary measures of 
valuation (in addition to or instead of 
monetary measures). consider the 
most appropriate design of nonmarket 
valuation (e.g., choice experiments). 
Promote approaches to managing 
common-property resources. restrict 
commodification to certain types 
of ecosystem services (e.g., food 
production) and ban it for others.
sociocultural impact Policy guidance and 
priority setting, strategic 
objective and policy 
instruments
Emphasize community rather 
than individual benefits. develop 
baseline assessments and long-term 
studies of the impacts of particular 
applications. adopt the precautionary 
principle when the impacts are 
potentially significant.
changes in motivations all consider the design of motivational 
incentives in relation to the context. 
Employ instrumental incentives that 
enhance or complement intrinsic 
incentives. acknowledge up front the 
various motivations for protecting 
nature.
Equity implications Policy guidance and 
priority setting, strategic 
objective and policy 
instruments
identify the societal sectors that 
experience costs or benefits from 
ecosystem-service management. 
Employ fair compensation to those 
experiencing costs (e.g., through 
payments for ecosystem services 
[PEs] schemes). design PEs schemes 
as redistributional mechanisms or as 
compensation for ecological debts.
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(which involve arguments of justice) and ethical reasons that 
pertain to specific ideas about what humans need in order to 
lead a good life (Eser 2009).
Equity implications and environmental justice concerns 
relate mostly to priority-setting and policy-design applica-
tions. These concerns can be alleviated through comprehen-
sive identification of the sectors of society that experience 
costs or benefits from the management of a given ES in a 
given context. Such identification enables management of 
the service designed to yield a fair distribution of the costs 
and benefits (e.g., through PES schemes or through a fair 
distribution of property rights).
Placing ES in a broader management context
Addressing ethical concerns related to the ES concept 
requires also placing the approach within a broader policy 
and management context—that is, treating it as one pos-
sible management strategy alongside the many others that 
are related to the fields of action-orientated research and 
evidence-based policy or management. This allows the full 
gamut of ethical questions to be raised and the answers to be 
compared across different possible management approaches. 
Central to these approaches is the issue of problem framing 
(or problem recognition), which involves individuals, com-
munities, or organizations coming together to agree that 
there is a problem that ought to be addressed.
The ES approach is often accompanied by a zero-price-
problem narrative of ecosystem goods with public good 
character (Kinzig et al. 2011), which is just one way in which 
problems can be framed. Contemporary approaches to 
environmental management—particularly those that have 
evolved out of the sustainability debate—often take the 
position that problem framing must be done in an inclusive, 
participatory way and must be based on interdisciplinary 
frameworks that involve scientific experts, policymakers, 
and stakeholders (Munda et al. 2008). If it is accepted that 
procedural legitimacy can be strengthened through demo-
cratic and participatory approaches, the ethical issues that 
follow are related to whether the process of problem framing 
can identify the relevant stakeholders, how powerless stake-
holders would be given a voice, and whether the ES concept 
is appropriate for the particular context.
A key principle of inclusive ecosystem management, in 
which, it could be argued, the ES approach is embedded, is 
that decisions about resource use are a matter of social choice 
(Potschin and Haines-Young 2011). If actions related to ES 
management are to appropriately address ethical consider-
ations, the decisionmaking process must involve a clear articu-
lation of management options to allow informed choices to be 
made. A criticism of stakeholder engagement is that it is often 
misused as a way of legitimizing decisions that have already 
been made and pays only lip service to consultation (Shepherd 
and Bowler 1997). Stakeholders may be more willing to take 
ownership of solutions that they had a role in developing.
Central to the ES approach is evidence-based decision-
making, which is designed to integrate understanding (with 
even in the context of common-pool resources. Concerns 
associated with commodification may also be addressed by 
restricting commodification to certain types of ES or ben-
efits in contexts in which markets are already widespread 
(e.g., food production) and even banning it in specific envi-
ronmental domains. The latter option would be appropriate 
for benefits directly linked to vital social values or processes, 
to ES covering basic conditions for life (conceivable as 
rights), and to ecological processes and components for 
which there may not be economic substitutes and for which 
private property rights can have undesirable effects (e.g., 
clean air, potable water).
Ethical concerns regarding sociocultural impacts  pertain 
mostly to the priority-setting applications of the ES concept 
and, to a lesser degree, to designing policy instruments. 
Addressing sociocultural ethical concerns in general effec-
tively requires baseline assessments accompanied by long-
term studies of the impacts of a particular application across 
diverse communities and adoption of the precautionary 
principle when it is necessary. What limited evidence exists 
(see the “Sociocultural impact” section) suggests a loss of 
common-access rights and little benefit for poorer people 
in PES scheme implementations in developing countries. 
Tackling these concerns may require a greater emphasis on 
community rather than on individual benefits and rights 
(table 2).
Ethical concerns around changes in motivation are rel-
evant to all ES applications that appeal to self-interest or that 
invoke new incentives for conserving nature. The concerns 
about motivational crowding out can be addressed largely 
by adequate design of the motivational incentives in relation 
to the contexts in which they are applied (see Bowles 2008). 
The behavioral outcomes of incentives depend on a variety 
of factors, including the nature of motivations and the type 
of incentive, and the likelihood of motivational crowd-
ing out is higher when habits have an important prosocial 
component, intrinsic or moral motivations are salient, and 
rewards are monetary and relatively low (Lacetera and Macis 
2010). In this context, a key challenge is to identify institu-
tional designs for motivational structures in which intrinsic 
and utilitarian values complement each other and to identify 
situations in which the use of utility-based rationales (e.g., 
financial incentives) may undermine the moral sentiments 
for conservation (Bowles 2008). Initiatives will more suc-
cessfully appeal to intrinsic and instrumental motivations 
if they are explicit about the moral value of an action and 
also offer technical or financial assistance—or both—toward 
that action. Initiatives must also explicitly acknowledge 
the various motivations and reasons for protecting and 
managing nature. The associated communication strategy 
must convey the message that monetary values of ES are 
minimum values only and that intangible values related to, 
for example, cultural services are priceless (see TEEB 2008, 
figure 3.2, which places monetary values of ES in context). 
Apart from prudential reasons that appeal to self-interests, 
communication strategies should also stress moral reasons 
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the appropriateness of the ES concept (Corbera et al. 2007, 
Vatn 2010), along with scrutiny of the balance between pri-
vate and public goods and benefits.
As we argued above, decisions and actions with regard 
to ES occur in the face of substantial uncertainty. The 
outcomes of actions must therefore be monitored, and the 
actions must be modified if the outcomes are not desirable. 
Monitoring and adaptive management (i.e., learning from 
mistakes) is vital to demonstrate the appropriate expenditure 
of funds and to show that the expectations of stakeholders 
and wider society have been met without significant unin-
tended consequences. The motivation for adopting this type 
of adaptive management is technical (owing to uncertainty) 
and ethical. That is, we argue, it is ethical to reconsider the 
initial decision if evidence suggests that the outcomes from 
that decision are unacceptable.
Conclusions
The ES concept is applied in many different contexts, which 
yield different consequences and raise different suites of 
ethical issues. Although the economic framing of ES in 
general—and their monetary valuation in particular—have 
received special attention, this emphasis does not (and 
should not) necessarily lead to a denial of the nonuse and 
intrinsic values of nature. These particular values may not 
be central to economic conceptualizations of the benefits 
of nature, but there are means for effectively integrating 
intangible and noneconomic values into ES practice (Chan 
et al. 2012). Applications of the ES concept that involve the 
monetization or commodification of nature raise a raft of 
ethical issues that are not necessarily pertinent to using the 
concept to raise awareness or develop strategic arguments. 
Therefore, it is vital to recognize the context dependence of 
ethical concerns to ensure that the most relevant concerns 
are addressed for a given application.
The increasing prominence of the ES concept has occurred 
in parallel with the rise of a globalized economy, increasing 
privatization of public assets, greater government deregula-
tion, and economic rationalism. This environment is chal-
lenging for promoting nonmonetary values of nature, and 
local communities that elevate intrinsic values above all else 
may be economically disadvantaged, especially consider-
ing the increasing opportunities afforded by global trade. 
For example, the global trade in timber means that forest 
resources can be harvested from a number of locations, and 
local communities that promote these instrumental values 
of forests may experience greater financial reward than 
those that do not, putting increasing pressure on the latter to 
abandon some of their intrinsic values, especially in times of 
economic hardship. Some policy instruments (e.g., REDD) 
are designed to address this issue by establishing financial 
incentives for forest protection. However, these instruments 
are very new, and their capacity for long-term protection 
is untested. Promoting the intrinsic values of nature will 
likely become increasingly difficult with growing economic 
uncertainty.
available evidence) of the social implications of environ-
mental change across all stakeholders. However, there is a 
risk that ES applications may entrench existing inequalities, 
because some stakeholders have greater access to evidence 
and its integration into decisionmaking than do others 
(Ferraro 2008). In order to mitigate these political-economy 
kinds of ethical issues, decisionmakers should be transpar-
ent and inclusive regarding the type and availability of evi-
dence and regarding how that evidence is scrutinized. This 
includes establishing at the outset the use of quantitative or 
qualitative data as evidence, how to treat uncertainty, the 
roles of different stakeholder groups in evaluating the evi-
dence, how to ensure equitable access to information, and 
the tools needed to process and analyze the information. 
A fair process is likely to facilitate fair outcomes, but since 
some stakeholder groups may not possess even the capacity 
to effectively advocate for a desirable process, arrangements 
to ensure that all parties have effective advocates is essential 
(Ferraro 2008).
Regardless of the evidence base, choices regarding actions 
will eventually be made, and at this point, ethical issues 
become most apparent, because the process generally involves 
using a set of criteria to weigh the consequences of alternative 
choices. Much of the debate surrounding the major ethical 
issues listed above concerns the nature of the criteria used to 
assess choices. For example, the monetary valuation of nature 
is only one approach, or one possible valuation language, to 
demonstrate the importance of the natural environment to 
humanity (Martínez-Alier 2002, Chan et al. 2012).
In many situations, multiple criteria are used to assess 
choices, even when most stakeholders agree that economic 
values are a significant element in their decisionmaking pro-
cess (Munda 2008). For example, it is widely acknowledged 
that the valuation of marginal changes in the economic 
value of ES can be meaningful only when socioecological 
systems are not close to a tipping point or regime shift (e.g., 
Limburg et al. 2002, Fisher et al. 2008). In the context of 
sustainability science, for example, the criteria used to evalu-
ate policy or management proposals should be based on an 
inclusive, deliberative, and participative process and should 
also be revelatory and designed to minimize the number of 
losers (O’Riordan 2000).
Once a decision has been made, the management action 
to be implemented will also probably raise ethical issues. 
These issues may actually be included in the criteria that are 
considered during the choicemaking process, but it is worth 
separating the implementation phase from the earlier phases 
in order to emphasize that ends do not necessarily justify 
means. For example, it may be economically efficient to pay 
landowners to supply a particular ES (e.g., water filtration), 
but, as was discussed above, from the perspective of environ-
mental justice, it may not be morally appropriate to com-
pensate landowners for not undertaking actions that may be 
considered damaging to other sectors of society. The rights 
and responsibilities associated with the ownership of land or 
resources have to be part of the ethical debate surrounding 
 at U
niversitat A
utonom
a Barcelona on July 22, 2014
http://bioscience.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
1028   BioScience  •  December 2012 / Vol. 62 No. 12 www.biosciencemag.org
Articles Articles
Ferraro PJ. 2008. Asymmetric information and contract design for pay-
ments for environmental services. Ecological Economics 65: 810–821.
Fisher B, et al. 2008. Ecosystem services and economic theory: Integration 
for policy-relevant research. Ecological Applications 18: 2050–2067.
García-Llorente M, Martín-López B, Montes C. 2011. Exploring the moti-
vations of protesters in contingent valuation: Insights for conservation 
policies. Environmental Science and Policy 14: 76–88.
Gneezy U, Rustichini A. 2000. A fine is a price. Journal of Legal Studies 29: 
1–17.
Goldman RL, Tallis H, Kareiva P, Daily GC. 2008. Field evidence that 
ecosystem service projects support biodiversity and diversify options. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105: 9445–9448.
Gómez-Baggethun E, Ruiz-Pérez M. 2011. Economic valuation and the 
commodification of ecosystem services. Progress in Physical Geography 
35: 613–628.
Gómez-Baggethun E, de Groot R, Lomas PL, Montes C. 2010. The history 
of ecosystem services in economic theory and practice: From early 
notions to markets and payment schemes. Ecological Economics 69: 
1209–1218.
Grieg-Gran M, Porras I, Wunder S. 2005. How can market mechanisms for 
forest environmental services help the poor? Preliminary lessons from 
Latin America. World Development 33: 1511–1527.
Ibarra JT, Barreau A, Del Campo C, Camacho CI, Martin GJ, McCandless 
SR. 2011. When formal and market-based conservation mechanisms 
disrupt food sovereignty: Impacts of community conservation and 
payments for environmental services on an indigenous community of 
Oaxaca, Mexico. International Forestry Review 13: 318–337.
Kinzig AP, Perrings C, Chapin FS III, Polasky S, Smith VK, Tilman D, Turner 
BL II. 2011. Paying for ecosystem services—Promise and peril. Science 
334: 603–604.
Kosoy N, Corbera E. 2010. Payments for ecosystem services as commodity 
fetishism. Ecological Economics 69: 1228–1236.
Kremen C, Williams NM, Bugg RL, Fay JP, Thorp RW. 2004. The area 
requirements of an ecosystem service: Crop pollination by native bee 
communities in California. Ecology Letters 7: 1109–1119.
Kumar P, ed. 2010. The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity: 
Ecological and Economic Foundations. Earthscan.
Lacetera N, Macis M. 2010. Do all material incentives for pro-social activi-
ties backfire? The response to cash and non-cash incentives for blood 
donations. Journal of Economic Psychology 31: 738–748.
Larson B. 2011. Metaphors for Environmental Sustainability: Redefining 
our Relationship with Nature. Yale University Press.
Limburg KE, O’Neill RV, Costanza R, Farber S. 2002. Complex systems and 
valuation. Ecological Economics 41: 409–420.
Liu J, Li S, Ouyan Z, Tam C, Chen X. 2008. Ecological and socioeconomic 
effects of China’s policies for ecosystem services. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences 105: 9477–9482.
Lovelock J. 2000. Gaia: A new look at life on Earth. Oxford University 
Press.
Lubchenco J, Sutley N. 2010. Proposed U.S. policy for ocean, coast, and 
Great Lakes stewardship. Science 328: 1485–1486.
Ludwig D. 2000. Limitations of economic valuation of ecosystems. 
Ecosystems 3: 31–35
[MA] Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. 2005. Ecosystem and Human 
Well-being: Synthesis. Island Press.
Martín-López B, Montes C, Benayas J. 2008. Economic valuation of biodi-
versity conservation: The meaning of numbers. Conservation Biology 
22: 624–635.
Martínez-Alier J. 2002. The Environmentalism of the Poor: A Study of 
Ecological Conflicts and Valuation. Edward Elgar.
Miles L, Kapos V. 2008. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforesta-
tion and forest degradation. Science 320: 1454–1455.
Munda G. 2008. Social Multi-criteria Evaluation for a Sustainable Economy. 
Springer.
Muñoz-Piña C, Guevara A, Torres JM, Braña J. 2008. Paying for the hydro-
logical services of Mexico’s forests: Analysis, negotiations and results. 
Ecological Economics 65: 725–736.
Our approach provides both generalized and specific rec-
ommendations. Several commentators have emphasized the 
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